Selected Research

The Core in Committee Selection and Participatory Budgeting

• Auditing for Core Stability in Participatory Budgeting with Kamesh Munagala and Yiheng Shen (WINE 2022)

• Approximate Core for Committee Selection via Multilinear Extension and Market Clearing with Kamesh Munagala, Yiheng Shen and Zhiyi Wang (SODA 2022)

• Approximately Stable Committee Selection with Zhihao Jiang and Kamesh Munagala (STOC 2020)

• Group Fairness in Committee Selection with Yu Cheng, Zhihao Jiang and Kamesh Munagala (EC 2019 / TEAC)

Metric Distortion in Social Choice

• Improved Metric Distortion for Deterministic Social Choice Rules with Kamesh Munagala (EC 2019)

Mechanism Design / Auction Design

• Prior-Independent Auctions for Heterogeneous Bidders with Guru Guruganesh, Aranyak Mehta and Di Wang

• Optimal Pricing Schemes for an Impatient Buyer with Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao and Balu Sivan (SODA 2023)

• Approximately Efficient Bilateral Trade with Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao and Balu Sivan (STOC 2022)

• A Simple Mechanism for a Budget-Constrained Buyer with Yu Cheng, Nick Gravin and Kamesh Munagala (WINE 2018 / TEAC)

Information Design / Bayesian Persuasion

• Fair Price Discrimination with Sid Banerjee, Kamesh Munagala and Yiheng Shen

• The Limits of an Information Intermediary in Auction Design with Reza Alijani, Sid Banerjee and Kamesh Munagala (EC 2022)

• Interactive Communication in Bilateral Trade with Jieming Mao and Renato Paes Leme (ITCS 2022)

Miscellaneous Approximations in Computational Economics

• Regret Minimization with Noisy Observations with Mohammad Mahdian and Jieming Mao (EC 2023)

• Optimal Algorithms for Multiwinner Elections and the Chamberlin-Courant Rule with Kamesh Munagala and Zeyu Shen (EC 2021)

• Online Stochastic Matching with Edge Arrivals with Nick Gravin and Zhihao Gavin Tang (ICALP 2021)

• Predict and Match: Prophet Inequalities with Uncertain Supply with Reza Alijani, Sid Banerjee, Sreenivas Gollapudi and Kamesh Munagala (SIGMETRICS 2020 / POMACS)