Mechanism Design and Auctions
Bilateral trade is a common economic scenario with a rich literature. The celebrated Myerson-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem shows that bilateral trade generally cannot be fully efficient under incentives. However, our work reveals that simple mechanisms can always be approximately efficient, answering a prominent open question. Our other works explore the impact of budget constraints, consumer impatience, lack of priors, and valuation correlation on pricing, auctions, and bilateral trade settings.
Prior-Independent Auctions for Heterogeneous Bidders with Guru Guruganesh, Aranyak Mehta and Di Wang
Optimal Pricing Schemes for an Impatient Buyer with Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao and Balasubramanian Sivan
Approximately Efficient Bilateral Trade with Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao and Balasubramanian Sivan
A Simple Mechanism for a Budget-Constrained Buyer with Yu Cheng, Nick Gravin and Kamesh Munagala
The celebrated work The Limits of Price Discrimination by Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris proposes a novel model of third-degree price discrimination, which has close conceptual connection with information design and Bayesian persuasion. Using their framework, we study the value of persuasion in more general economic scenarios, such as auctions, bilateral trade, and pricing with fairness considerations.
Fair Price Discrimination with Siddhartha Banerjee, Kamesh Munagala and Yiheng Shen
The Limits of an Information Intermediary in Auction Design with Reza Alijani, Siddhartha Banerjee and Kamesh Munagala
Interactive Communication in Bilateral Trade with Jieming Mao and Renato Paes Leme
Metric Distortion in Social Choice
Metric distortion in social choice is a well-studied framework that provides a way to quantitatively measure the efficiency of voting rules. We design new simple voting rules that broke long-standing efficiency barriers, giving constructive answers to frequently asked open questions.
The Core in Committee Selection and Participatory Budgeting
Committee selection and participatory budgeting are common democratic scenarios that require fair solutions. The core is often considered as a solution concept that provides the ultimate form of proportionality guarantees. In many settings, even though core solutions may not exist, we show that natural relaxations of them (via approximation and randomization) always do.
Auditing for Core Stability in Participatory Budgeting with Kamesh Munagala and Yiheng Shen
Approximate Core for Committee Selection via Multilinear Extension and Market Clearing with Kamesh Munagala, Yiheng Shen and Zhiyi Wang
Approximately Stable Committee Selection with Zhihao Jiang and Kamesh Munagala
Group Fairness in Committee Selection with Yu Cheng, Zhihao Jiang and Kamesh Munagala
Other Topics in Economics and Computation
I am broadly interested in designing economic solutions using mathematical and algorithmic ideas, especially when it comes to approximation guarantees.
Regret Minimization with Noisy Observations with Mohammad Mahdian and Jieming Mao
Optimal Algorithms for Multiwinner Elections and the Chamberlin-Courant Rule with Kamesh Munagala and Zeyu Shen
Online Stochastic Matching with Edge Arrivals with Nick Gravin and Zhihao Gavin Tang
Predict and Match: Prophet Inequalities with Uncertain Supply with Reza Alijani, Siddhartha, Sreenivas Gollapudi and Kamesh Munagala