Selected Research
The Core in Committee Selection and Participatory Budgeting
Auditing for Core Stability in Participatory Budgeting with Kamesh Munagala and Yiheng Shen (WINE 2022)
Approximate Core for Committee Selection via Multilinear Extension and Market Clearing with Kamesh Munagala, Yiheng Shen and Zhiyi Wang (SODA 2022)
Approximately Stable Committee Selection with Zhihao Jiang and Kamesh Munagala (STOC 2020)
Group Fairness in Committee Selection with Yu Cheng, Zhihao Jiang and Kamesh Munagala (EC 2019 / TEAC)
Metric Distortion in Social Choice
Improved Metric Distortion for Deterministic Social Choice Rules with Kamesh Munagala (EC 2019)
Mechanism Design / Auction Design
Prior-Independent Auctions for Heterogeneous Bidders with Guru Guruganesh, Aranyak Mehta and Di Wang
Optimal Pricing Schemes for an Impatient Buyer with Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao and Balu Sivan (SODA 2023)
Approximately Efficient Bilateral Trade with Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao and Balu Sivan (STOC 2022)
A Simple Mechanism for a Budget-Constrained Buyer with Yu Cheng, Nick Gravin and Kamesh Munagala (WINE 2018 / TEAC)
Information Design / Bayesian Persuasion
Fair Price Discrimination with Sid Banerjee, Kamesh Munagala and Yiheng Shen
The Limits of an Information Intermediary in Auction Design with Reza Alijani, Sid Banerjee and Kamesh Munagala (EC 2022)
Interactive Communication in Bilateral Trade with Jieming Mao and Renato Paes Leme (ITCS 2022)
Miscellaneous Approximations in Computational Economics
Regret Minimization with Noisy Observations with Mohammad Mahdian and Jieming Mao (EC 2023)
Optimal Algorithms for Multiwinner Elections and the Chamberlin-Courant Rule with Kamesh Munagala and Zeyu Shen (EC 2021)
Online Stochastic Matching with Edge Arrivals with Nick Gravin and Zhihao Gavin Tang (ICALP 2021)
Predict and Match: Prophet Inequalities with Uncertain Supply with Reza Alijani, Sid Banerjee, Sreenivas Gollapudi and Kamesh Munagala (SIGMETRICS 2020 / POMACS)