Selected Research 

Mechanism Design and Auctions

Bilateral trade is a common economic scenario with a rich literature. The celebrated Myerson-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem shows that bilateral trade generally cannot be fully efficient under incentives. However, our work reveals that simple mechanisms can always be approximately efficient, answering a prominent open question. Our other works explore the impact of budget constraints, consumer impatience, lack of priors, and valuation correlation on pricing, auctions, and bilateral trade settings.

Information Design

The celebrated work The Limits of Price Discrimination by Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris proposes a novel model of third-degree price discrimination, which has close conceptual connection with information design and Bayesian persuasion. Using their framework, we study the value of persuasion in more general economic scenarios, such as auctions, bilateral trade, and pricing with fairness considerations.

Metric Distortion in Social Choice

Metric distortion in social choice is a well-studied framework that provides a way to quantitatively measure the efficiency of voting rules. We design new simple voting rules that broke long-standing efficiency barriers, giving constructive answers to frequently asked open questions.

The Core in Committee Selection and Participatory Budgeting

Committee selection and participatory budgeting are common democratic scenarios that require fair solutions. The core is often considered as a solution concept that provides the ultimate form of proportionality guarantees. In many settings, even though core solutions may not exist, we show that natural relaxations of them (via approximation and randomization) always do.

Other Topics in Economics and Computation

I am broadly interested in designing economic solutions using mathematical and algorithmic ideas, especially when it comes to approximation guarantees.